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Manifestation: The Least Defensible Insurance
Coverage Theory for Asbestos-Related Disease
Suits
Approximately 450 asbestos-related disease lawsuits are
filed against asbestos manufacturers each month in the United
States.1 From these tort actions, another type of lawsuit arose to
plague the courts. This second type of lawsuit involves declara-
tory judgment actions among manufacturers and insurers con-
cerning who will pay the enormous amounts of money required
to compensate the asbestos-diseased victims.2  The parties
involved vigorously litigate the comprehensive general liability
insurance policies which cover the products liability suits. The
basic controversy between the insurers and manufacturers stems
from the latent and pernicious character of asbestos-related dis-
eases.' Because manufacturers were covered by more than one
1. Hertzberg, Asbestos Lawsuits Spur War Among Insurers, With Billions at
Stake, Wall St. J., June 14, 1982, at 1, col. 6. A Labor Department study conducted by
Irving J. Selikoff of Mount Sinai Medical Center in New York predicted that at least
8,500 workers-and perhaps as many as 10,000-will die each year of asbestos-related
diseases. Id. Asbestos-related disease lawsuits now number above 20,000. Lublin, Occu-
pational Diseases Receive More Scrutiny Since The Manville Case, Wall St. J., Dec. 20,
1982, at 1, col. 6.
Amatex, the UNR Corporations, and the Manville Corporation have all filed bank-
ruptcy in an effort to deal with these lawsuits. The UNR Corporation requested a U.S.
District Court Judge to appoint a representative for all future but unknown asbestos
claimants. It is not clear if the court has authority to define future claims. If the judge
approves UNR's request, a Chapter 11 bankruptcy may look very attractive to the
twenty or so other asbestos companies. Richards, UNR Case May Set Legal History
With Effort to Limit Asbestos Suits, Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1982, at 31, col. 3.
The Manville Corporation has asked a federal bankruptcy court to estimate the dol-
lar amount of both pending and unfiled health claims against the company using actua-
rial and statistical data, economic matters, and pertinent historical claim and litigation
records. Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1983, at 12, col. 2.
2. Four cases have been decided by four different United States Circuit Courts of
Appeal with three conflicting results. See infra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. The
Supreme Court has denied certiorari on all four. At least thirty-six additional insurance
coverage lawsuits are pending throughout the country. Wermiel, Supreme Court Reaf-
firms It Won't Decide Who Is Liable for Asbestos Injury Claims, Wall St. J., Mar. 8,
1983, at 12, col. 1. See Rosow and Liederman, An Overview to the Interpretive Problems
of "Occurrence" in Comprehensive General Liability Insurance, 16 FORUM 1148, 1153
(1981) for a list of 18 cases.
3. Physical manifestation of the symptoms of asbestosis does not appear until ten to
twenty years after initial exposure, and it is difficult to determine exactly when the
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insurance policy during the years in which a victim was exposed
to asbestos fibers, insurers, excess insurers and manufacturers
disagree with respect to which policy's coverage is triggered by
the occurrence of the disease.
The gravamen of the insurer's and manufacturer's disagree-
ment centers upon the proper choice between two main liability
theories: exposure and manifestation. The exposure theory
assigns liability to the insurer covering the risk during the vic-
tim's exposure to asbestos. The manifestation theory provides
that the insurer covering a company when the disease first
manifests itself in medically diagnosable symptoms must pro-
vide coverage. Three circuit courts of appeal have arrived at dif-
ferent conclusions regarding when coverage is triggered. The
Sixth Circuit in Insurance Company of North America v. Forty-
Eight Insulations" ("Forty-Eight Insulations") applied the
exposure theory; the D.C. Circuit in Keene Corp. v. Insurance
Company of North America5 ("Keene") combined the exposure
and manifestation theories; and, in the most recent case, the
First Circuit in Eagle-Picher Industries Inc. v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company6 ("Eagle-Picher") opted for the manifesta-
tion theory.7
injury begins. See infra notes 9-20 and accompanying text.
4. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), afl'd on rehearing, 657 F.2d 814, cert. denied 454
U.S. 1109 (1981), reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 1009 (1982). Porter v. American Optical Corp.,
641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1109 (1981) also adopted the expo-
sure theory by agreeing with the decision in Forty-Eight Insulations.
5. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1007 (1982).
6. 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1279 (1983).
7. The Supreme Court has declined to resolve the issue of which insurance coverage
theory should be applied. When it refused certiorari for Eagle-Picher "it was the fourth
time in two years that the high court has refused to get involved in an issue which has
bitterly divided the insurance industry and that has tied state and federal courts in
knots." When the Court denied certiorari for the Keene case, three justices voted to hear
the case. There were no votes in favor of hearing Eagle-Picher. Many lawyers say that
the reason the justices refuse to become involved in the controversy is because the cases
involve state law interpretation of insurance contracts and not federal law or the United
States Constitution. Wermiel, supra note 2.
There is, nonetheless, a need for one theory of insurance liability to guide the courts
through the congestion of insurance coverage lawsuits (see supra note 2) and to discour-
age forum shopping (see infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text). Consistent applica-
tion of one theory would streamline the process from a litigant's standpoint. Attorneys
note that the Eagle-Picher decision has created greater confusion in handling claims and
it is very unclear how to treat the next case down the road. See Tarnoff, Manifestation
Ruling Clouds Asbestos Coverage Litigation, Bus. Ins. July 12, 1982. One theory would
provide insurers and insureds with information to plan for liability costs in the years
ahead.
Many commentators envision a legislative fund as the solution. Victims of asbestos-
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The First Circuit erred in Eagle-Picher by adopting yet
another rule of law to adjudicate insurer's liability. Furthermore,
the manifestation theory applied by the court is the least defen-
sible rule because it is incompatible with the medical evidence.
The Eagle-Picher court erred on two other counts: first, its
application of contract interpretation principles failed to recog-
nize the equal bargaining position between Eagle-Picher and the
insurance companies; second, its decision failed to hold manu-
facturers responsible for uninsured periods. The best solution is
to adopt the compromise theory proposed by Judge Wald in her
concurrence in Keene. Wald's proposal apportions liability
between insurers providing coverage during periods of both
exposure and manifestation, but includes the manufacturer as a
self-insurer for the years it failed to take out insurance.
This Note will first explain the nature of asbestos diseases,
the standard insurance policy language, and the theories of
insurance coverage. It will then demonstrate the misapplications
of medical evidence and contract interpretation principles in
Eagle-Picher, and conclude with a discussion of the wider impli-
cations of the decision and the better theory suggested by Judge
Wald. Because the facts and issues involved in Forty-Eight
Insulations, Keene, and Eagle-Picher are essentially the same,8
related diseases could bypass the courts and be compensated directly from a fund similar
to the Black Lung Fund. A single theory of insurance coverage could serve as a basis for
determining how much the insurance companies would contribute to a legislative fund.
The following bills have been introduced to Congress to address the asbestos injury com-
pensation problem: Occupational Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1982, H.R. 5735,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (introduced by Rep. Miller); Asbestos Health Hazards Com-
pensation Act of 1981, S. 1643, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. (1981) (introduced by Senator
Hart); Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act, H.R. 5224, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981) (introduced by Rep. Fenwick).
Observers see a reasonable chance that both Houses will approve a bill by late next
year. One stumbling block is the asbestos industry itself, which insists that the federal
government should pay 50% of the compensation costs because the insulation and
fireproofing material was widely used by private contractors to build ships for the gov-
ernment during World War II. Representative George Miller is sponsoring an alternative
bill which lacks any federal payments. An eventual compromise could require the gov-
ernment to provide partial compensation, perhaps 10% to 15%. Lublin, supra note 1.
The American Bar Association has urged Congress to find a way to handle the
thousands of pending lawsuits involving asbestos-related diseases. It concluded the law
could no longer be left to state and federal courts which apply the varied law of all 50
states. Wermiel, Lawyers' Group Urges Congress to Find Way to Resolve Lawsuits Over
Asbestos, Wall St. J., Feb. 10, 1983, at 12, col. 1.
8. Forty-Eight Insulations was the first case concerning insurance for asbestos liti-
gation to reach the appellate court level. Forty-Eight Insulations had varied products
liability insurance policies over 20 years issued by five different insurance companies.
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the conclusions drawn from Eagle-Picher apply equally to the
other cases.
The nature of asbestos-related diseases complicates the
determination of an applicable insurance coverage theory.
Asbestos exposure can give rise to asbestosis and mesothelioma e
and is associated with increased risk of lung and gastrointestinal
cancer.10 Of these diseases, asbestosis has been the most com-
monly reported" and has been the subject of most of the medi-
cal testimony in cases disputing the insurance coverage theo-
ries."5 Physical symptoms of asbestosis' 3 occur ten to twenty
Before 1955 it was self-insured. Insurance Company of North America sought a declara-
tory judgment to settle the dispute among the insurance carriers as to which carrier or
carriers were liable under the policy provisions. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at
1213-16.
From 1961 to 1982, four insurance companies provided Keene with products liability
insurance during different time periods. When Keene tendered the asbestos-related dam-
age cases to them for defense and indemnification, each company denied all responsibil-
ity for the suits or accepted only partial responsibility. The Keene Corporation sought a
declaratory judgment of the rights and obligations of the parties under the comprehen-
sive general liability policies. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1038-39.
For a discussion of Eagle-Picher, see infra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
9. Mesothelioma is a type of cancer affecting primarily the lining of the lungs. It was
relatively rare until the widespread use of asbestos. Mehaffy, Asbestos-Related Lung
Disease, 16 FORUM 341, 343 (1980). Mesothelioma becomes a serious problem 30 to 35
years after onset of exposure. Untreated cases almost always result in death within a
year, and current conventional treatment has done little to alter the prognosis. 4A
GRAY'S ArrORNEY's TEXTBOOK OF MEDIcINE § 205C.72 (3d ed. 1980).
10. The greatest hazards from the inhalation of asbestos fibers are the late-appear-
ing cancers. Estimates indicate that 15% of patients with clinically significant asbestosis
develop bronchogenic carcinoma usually within 20 to 40 years after the asbestosis has
been diagnosed. Mesothelioma is less common but its incidence is one thousand times
that expected in the unexposed population. S. RoBINs & R. COTRAN, PATHOLOGICAL BASIS
OF DISEASE, 527-28 (2d ed. 1979).
Asbestosis affects 7% of exposed asbestos workers; mesothelioma kills 7-10% of
exposed asbestos workers; gastrointestinal cancer kills 8-9% of exposed asbestos workers.
Before government regulation, 20-25% of exposed asbestos workers (both smokers and
nonsmokers) died of lung cancer. Occupational Diseases and Their Compensation, 1979:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 79-80
(1979) (statement of Dr. David P. Rail, Director, National Institute of Environmental
Health Sciences) (hereinafter cited as Hearings).
11. Mortality statistics in a National Institute for Occupational Safety & Health
epidemiologic study of workers employed in an asbestos manufacturing plant suggest
that lung cancer and asbestosis have peaked and mesothelioma is just beginning to be
observed. Hearings, supra note 10 at 50 (statement of Dr. Anthony Robbins, Director of
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Center for Disease Control,
Department of Health, Education and Welfare). "[W]ith mesothelioma we have yet to
see the worst of the disease." Hearings, supra note 10 at 70.
12. It is unclear whether the courts would interpret medical evidence from all asbes-
tos-related diseases similarly. See, e.g., Keene, 667 F.2d at 1038 n.3 (disregarding details
of medical development of diseases); Forty-Eight Insulations, 657 F.2d at 815 (relying
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years after working with asbestos products.14 After exposure and
before physical symptoms, the lungs are scarred by the inhaled
silicated fibers comprising asbestos. 15 Because of the body's
immune defense system located in the nasal and throat passages,
not every inhaled fiber reaches the lungs. 6 Those that do are
enveloped by an alveolar macrophage, a scavenger cell that
secretes dissolving enzymes in a futile attempt to destroy the
fiber. 1 7 The secreted enzymes eventually destroy surrounding
tissue and produce scarring.' Breathlessness upon exertion is
the first physical sign of asbestosis.' 9 As the disease progresses,
the victim becomes susceptible to incidental lung infections and
death from respiratory ailments.20 Problems arise when standard
insurance policy language is applied to indemnify manufacturers
who are being sued by individuals afflicted with this disease.
The insurance policies involved in asbestos-related disease
litigation typically use the same language. The relevant clauses
generally state that the insurer agrees to "pay on behalf of the
insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obli-
gated to pay as damages because of bodily injury. . . caused by
an occurrence." 2' Bodily injury is defined as "bodily injury, sick-
ness or disease. '22 An "occurrence" is defined as "an accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions. 2
Given this language, the courts try to decide when bodily injury
results-a very difficult problem since the pathogenesis of asbes-
tos-related diseases is frequently undefinable.2'
Courts have responded to the problems of asbestos-related
on medical evidence and policy grounds of administrative convenience to treat them
alike); Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 19 n.3 (finding support for the manifestation theory in
the medical evidence of other asbestos-related diseases. Mesothelioma and bronchogenic
carcinoma, although closely related, are not cumulative as is asbestosis).
13. Symptoms of asbestosis are shortness of breath, chest pains, coughing and club-
bing of the fingers. GrAY's, supra note 9 at 205C.30.
14. ROBINS & COTRAN, supra note 10 at 527.
15. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 18.
16. Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110, 115 (D.
Mass. 1981).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. GRAY's, supra note 9 at § 205C.30.
20. Id.
21. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 17; Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1216; Keene,
667 F.2d at 1057.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See supra notes 9-20 and accompanying text.
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diseases by applying three different theories of insurer liability:
exposure, manifestation and combination. Liability has been
apportioned among the manufacturers and insurance companies
in two ways: pro rata and liability in full. 5
Under the exposure theory, insurers providing coverage to
the manufacturer during the course of a victim's exposure to
asbestos must indemnify the insured. Each insult that results in
injury is an occurrence for the purpose of determining which
coverage applies. Thus, if a worker was exposed to asbestos from
1950 to 1953 and manifested symptoms of an asbestos-related
disease in 1977, the insurance company or companies insuring
against the risk from 1950 to 1953 would be responsible.26 Forty-
Eight Insulations adopted the exposure theory and prorated lia-
bility among all of the insurance companies which covered the
manufacturer while the injured victim was inhaling asbestos. 7
Forty-Eight Insulations was treated as a self-insurer for the
years it was without insurance and thus was responsible for a
pro rata share of indemnification and defense costs. 28
Under the manifestation theory, the insurer covering the
manufacturer when the disease first manifests itself in physically
diagnosable symptoms must provide compensation. Using the
same example, the insurer in 1977 would indemnify the manu-
facturer. The First Circuit applied this theory in Eagle-Picher.
A third theory combines exposure and manifestation. This
combination theory is also referred to as "triple trigger" or
"injurious process." '9 It views asbestos inhalation as an injurious
process. All insurers who provided insurance to the manufac-
turer from the time of first exposure, during exposure in resi-
dence (the period during which the disease is developing), and
25. Pro rata means "proportionately; according to a certain rate, percentage, or pro-
portion. According to measure, interest or liability." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1098 (5th
ed. 1979).
26. See Mansfield, Asbestos: The Case and the Insurance Problem, 15 FORUM 860,
876 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Mansfield].
27. For a discussion of the case, see Note, Duty to Indemnify and to Defend-Each
Insurer Which Provides Coverage During Worker's Exposure to Asbestos is Proportion-
ately and Individually Liable to Defend and Indemnify its Insured, 26 VELL. L. REV.
1080 (1981) and Note, Products Liability Insurance-Time of Exposure Triggers Cover-
age for Asbestos-Related Diseases, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 1127 (1980).
28. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1224, 1225.
29. See Rundle, Keene Jackpot: $300 million in coverage, Bus. Ins. Oct. 26, 1981, at
1. For further discussion of Keene see Note, Insurance Law and Asbestosis-When is
Coverage of a Progressive Disease Triggered? 58 WASH. L. REv. 63 (1982); Comment,
Asbestos Litigation: The Insurance Coverage Question, 15 IND. L. Rv. 831 (1982).
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manifestation are liable.30 The Keene court adopted this theory.
Each insurer was fully liable subject to "other insurance" provi-
sions which allocate liability among insurers when more than
one policy covers an injury.3s The Keene Corp. was not held lia-
ble for periods of time it was uninsured.'3 Judge Wald in her
concurrence advocated the combination theory, but with a pro
rata distribution of financial responsibility and with the manu-
facturer treated as a self-insurer for the years it failed to take
out insurance."
The Eagle-Picher court followed neither Forty-Eight Insu-
lations nor Keene. The experience of Eagle-Picher was typical of
other manufacturers except Eagle-Picher did not obtain insur-
ance coverage for liability resulting from exposure to its asbestos
products until 1968." It manufactured asbestos products
between 1931 and 1971.' From January 1968 through 1978, Lib-
erty Mutual provided primary insurance coverage, and from
June 1973 to 1979, Eagle-Picher had first one, and later two, lay-
ers of excess insurance coverage.' In 1977, Liberty Mutual
informed Eagle-Picher that the policy limits for 1974 and 1975
were about to be reached.' 7 Additionally, two excess insurers dis-
puted their coverage responsibilities to Eagle-Picher. " Eagle-
30. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1047.
31. Id. at 1050. "Other insurance" provisions provide a scheme by which the
insurer's liability is to be apportioned. Insurance Co. of North America (INA) policy
states, "When both this insurance and other insurance apply to the loss on the same
basis, whether primary, excessive or contingent, INA shall not be liable under this policy
for a greater proportion of the loss than stated in the applicable contribution provision."
Id. For an example of a contribution provision see Id. at n.35.
32. Id. at 1048-50.
33. Id. at 1057-58.
34. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 16. Keene Corp. could prove products liability cover-
age beginning 1961, Keene, 667 F.2d at 1038; Forty-Eight Insulations has been insured
for products liability suits since 1955, Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1215.
35. Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110, 111 (D.
Mass. 1981).
36. Excess insurance is the amount of insurance coverage that is beyond the dollar
amount of coverage of one carrier but which is required to pay a particular loss, as dis-
tinguished from "other insurance" which may be used to pay or contribute to the loss.
BLACK'S LAW DIOIONARY 504 (5th ed. 1979). Excess insurers for Eagle-Picher are Ameri-
can Motorists Insurance Company and various underwriters in the London Market.
Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 15.
37. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 15.
38. American Motorists acknowledged receipt of the notice but indicated disagree-
ment with Liberty Mutual's assignment of claims to policy periods and its handling of
claims. Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110, 112 (D. Mass.
1981). American Motorists implied that Liberty Mutual's coverage would not be
exhausted under the proper interpretation. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 15. The London
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Picher brought an action seeking a declaration of rights and lia-
bilities of its various insurers pursuant to the applicable policies.
Only two theories of insurance coverage were presented in
the district court: exposure and manifestation. 9 The district
court invoked the manifestation theory based on the medical
evidence, the common meaning of the policy language, and the
principle of construing contracts to promote coverage. 40 The
insurers covering a company at the time the asbestos-related
disease first manifested itself by way of medically diagnosable
symptoms would provide coverage under this theory. This deci-
sion placed the burden on Liberty Mutual and the excess insur-
ers to defend and indemnify. The years 1974 and 1975 would be
covered by excess insurers when Liberty Mutual's policy limits
were reached.
The exposure theorists (basically the excess insurers)
appealed. They argued that the district court erred by excluding
extrinsic evidence of Eagle-Picher's intent in obtaining the poli-
cies and that the court misconstrued the policies as a matter of
law."' Eagle-Picher cross-appealed and, relying on Keene, argued
for the first time that all policies in force from the time of initial
exposure until and including the time of manifestation are trig-
gered by an asbestos claim.4' The court of appeals nevertheless
affirmed the district court by interpreting the medical evidence
and contract language as consistent with the manifestation
theory.
The Eagle-Picher court reasoned that exposure cannot trig-
ger coverage because subclinical injuries 3 do not occur simulta-
neously with initial exposure. 4 Even when the fiber is inhaled,
disabling disease and death are not inevitable.45 If a single expo-
sure was intended to trigger coverage, the policy language would
Market excess insurers sent a reservation of rights letter pending resolution of the cor-
rect theory of liability. Id. at 16.
39. Id. Eagle-Picher, Liberty Mutual, and various London Market underwriters
argued for the manifestation theory. American Motorists and other London Market
insurers argued for an "exposure" theory. At that time, Eagle-Picher was the only manu-
facturer advocating manifestation; all others advocated exposure. See Mansfield, supra
note 26, at 876.
40. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 16.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Subclinical means "[o]nly slightly abnormal and not detectable by the usual
clinical tests." WEBs'raR's SEVENTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 874 (1976).
44. See Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 19.
45. Id.
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have reflected this intent, rather than defining occurrence in
part as a "continuous or repeated" exposure to conditions.46 The
resulting injury, not the exposure, must take place during the
policy period.47 In addition, the court agreed that the common
meaning of the policy language supported manifestation because
an ordinary person with scarred lungs would not claim that the
disease resulted until his sense of well-being was impaired.4 The
court concluded from the medical evidence that the insurer cov-
ering the manufacturer at the time of manifestation of the dis-
ease should be responsible.
The court in Eagle-Picher misjudged the medical evidence
by ignoring the period when the lungs are being scarred. The
view that the manifestation theory was justified because death
and disease were not inevitable and because injury did not occur
simultaneously with exposure, does not comport with the long-
term, insidious nature of the disease. While an asbestos worker's
lungs may not be injured simultaneously with inhalation, even-
tually his lungs will suffer deleterious effects from the inhaled
fibers that invade and remain in the pulmonary tissue.
Efforts to categorize this disease under a solely manifesta-
tion or exposure theory are too simplistic and do not recognize
the special qualities of asbestosis. Asbestosis is a relentlessly
progressive disease characterized by pulmonary fibrotic4'
changes which develop slowly over the years.5 0 The process
begins near the time of initial exposure. The fibers insidiously
injure the lungs throughout the period of exposure, and the pro-
cess continues even after physical symptoms become evident.
Asbestosis is not an exact disease with a beginning that can be
pinpointed by either theory. Medical facts demonstrate that
injury occurs first to the lungs and, later, to physical well-being
as the condition progresses. Although death and disease do not
result for everyone, those who are afflicted with the disease
experience the process at a later stage. The Keene court's view
that the medical evidence presents asbestosis as part of an inju-
rious process most accurately describes the disease. 1
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. "Fibrotic" describes a condition marked by increase in interstitial fibrous tissue.
WmEBsT's, supra note 44.
50. See supra notes 9-20 and accompanying text.
51. "Regardless of whether exposure to asbestos causes an immediate and discrete
1983l
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In addition to weighing the medical evidence, the Eagle-
Picher court examined the insurance policy language in light of
contract interpretation principles. As stated by the First Circuit,
the foremost contract interpretation principle is to ascertain the
intent of the parties. Where the contract language is clear,
courts ascertain intent from the plain and ordinary meaning of
the language. Where the language is ambiguous, courts consider
extrinsic evidence. If the meaning of the contract language
remains unclear, courts construe the policy in favor of the
insured.2 Regardless of whether courts involved in asbestos
insurance litigation have correctly or incorrectly applied these
principles by actually declaring the language ambiguous,53 all of
them have relied on the theory of contra proferentem, constru-
ing language in favor of the insured, in order to maximize cover-
age to the insured."
The contra proferentem theory rests on the assumption that
insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion.55 Insurance con-
tracts are considered adhesion contracts because most are
drafted by insurers and there is a presumption that the industry
uses highly technical and obscure language in its policies that
places the customer at a disadvantage." However, most of the
injury, the fact that it is part of an injurious process is enough for it to constitute 'injury'
under the policies." Keene, 667 F.2d at 1046.
52. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 17.
53. In the Eagle-Picher case, on the district court level, the parties agreed the lan-
guage was unambiguous, yet they were diametrically opposed as to what they thought
the language meant. Id. at 18. The district court took them at their word and refused
extrinsic evidence regarding Eagle-Picher's bargaining power. Id. at 18, 21 n.6. However,
if the language of an insurance policy is subject to interpretation in opposite ways, or has
been interpreted differently by different courts, it is ambiguous, so as to permit the
introduction of extrinsic evidence in interpretation. 1 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSUR-
ANCE LAW, § 15:58 (2d ed. 1959). In this case a declaration of ambiguity was in order. The
Eagle-Picher court reasoned that because the issue of ambiguity was not raised below
and had not been urged on appeal, they would not consider it a basis for error. While the
Eagle-Picher court incorrectly found the language to be unambiguous, the other courts
have correctly found the language to be ambiguous. See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1041; Forty-
Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1219.
54. It has been argued that Eagle-Picher is not just another case of maximizing
coverage, because the Keene triple trigger approach was refused on appeal, and the
Keene approach would have given Eagle-Picher more coverage than just the manifesta-
tion theory. However, the appellate court may not have granted Eagle-Picher's request
for an interpretation similar to Keene because such a theory had not been argued at the
district court level. See Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 23, and Tarnoff, supra note 7.
55. See generally 1 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURAN E LAW, § 15:77 (2d ed. 1959);
R. KEETON, BAsic TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW, § 6.3(a) at 350 (1971).
56. Id. See also Ward, Coverage for Exposure: Destructive Judicial Legislation, 24
FOR THE DEFENSE, No. 3 at 12 (1982).
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manufacturers involved in asbestos litigation are large sophisti-
cated companies capable of negotiating an insurance contract.",
In Eagle-Picher, the exposure theorists unsuccessfully proffered
overwhelming evidence 8 relative to the sophistication of the
manufacturer.59 Sophisticated companies generally have attor-
57. The most common defendants are Johns-Manville, Eagle-Picher, Owens-Corn-
ing, Pittsburgh Corning, Celotex, Keene Corp., Armstrong Cork Co. and Raybestos-Man-
hattan. Mansfield, supra note 26. Amici Curiae to the Eagle-Picher appeal were Arm-
strong World Industries Inc., Johns-Manville Corporation, Johns-Manville Sales
Corporation, Johns-Manville International Corporation, Fibreboard Corporation,
Amatex Corporation, Asten Group, Inc., The Celotex Corporation, Crown Cork & Seal
Company, Inc., and Standard Insulations, Inc. Brief of Amici Curiae, Eagle-Picher
Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982).
58. The district court rejected the offer of evidence because it concluded that
whether or not the policies were contracts of adhesion could be determined by reading
the policies. The appellate court could find no Ohio or Illinois cases which abandoned or
weakened the presumption of construing ambiguous language in favor of the insured.
They also found that Eagle-Picher did not have unusual sophistication and did not so
actively participate in drafting so as to be denied benefit of the usual rule. The appellate
court reasoned that the district court relied on this policy only as an "additional strand
of support" and that any error in excluding evidence of Eagle-Picher's bargaining power
was harmless. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 21, n.6.
59. The evidence introduced at trial demonstrated that at least as early as 1965
Eagle-Picher had not only the resources and facilities of its own full time corporate
insurance director, but also the advice of in-house legal staff on such matters.
Evidence proffered by exposure theorists demonstrates that representatives of
Eagle-Picher were aware of risks inherent in asbestos-containing insulation
products in 1964; that prior to negotiating for and obtaining comprehensive
general liability coverage from Liberty Mutual in 1968, which included cover-
age for asbestos-related claims, Eagle-Picher had made the deliberate and con-
scious decision to maintain a self-insured status for such claims; that during
the period from 1955 through 1965 Eagle-Picher had been offered products
liability coverage with respect to claims arising from all of its products (includ-
ing asbestos-containing insulation products), but had rejected the same in
favor of a piecemeal program of self-insurance; that Eagle-Picher negotiated
and obtained its primary liability insurance directly from Liberty Mutual,
without broker involvement, for the period since January 1, 1968; that Eagle-
Picher negotiated and obtained its excess or umbrella coverage from the
London Market with the assistance of brokers; that asbestos-related claims
made against Eagle-Picher during the period from January 1, 1968 to an inde-
terminate date in 1971 were treated by both Eagle-Picher and Liberty Mutual
in accordance with the exposure position; that in 1971 Eagle-Picher proposed
to Liberty Mutual that coverage be afforded on a different basis, a proposal
which, after considerable negotiation, Liberty Mutual accepted in the form of
the special letter agreement between Eagle-Picher and Liberty Mutual dated
April 6, 1972; that Eagle-Picher was at all relevant times aware of its insurance
coverages and counseled concerning insurance matters; that the insurance
director of Eagle-Picher kept abreast of insurance industry developments and
publications in which relevant insurance subjects were discussed; and that the
duties of Eagle-Picher's insurance director included the negotiation of insur-
ance coverage and keeping abreast of the state of the art of risk management
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neys and insurance departments which can place them in a rela-
tively equal bargaining position with an insurance company. 0
Thus, reliance on the contra proferentem canon is unjustified.
In addition, reliance on contra proferentem is misplaced
because a different theory of insurance coverage can be reached
depending on the facts of the case. Eagle-Picher was first cov-
ered by products liability insurance beginning in 1968.61 The
First Circuit recognized that the exposure theory would not give
as much coverage to Eagle-Picher as the manifestation theory
since many workers were exposed prior to 1968. In order to max-
imize coverage under the facts of this case, the court adopted
the manifestation theory. Other courts have adopted different
liability theories in order to maximize coverage. The triple trig-
ger theory"' advanced in Keene also gave the manufacturer the
maximum coverage possible including coverage for the years the
manufacturer was uninsured. In Forty-Eight Insulations, the
exposure theory provided more coverage than the manifestation
theory.
Construing ambiguous contract language in favor of the
insured in asbestos cases can lead to a different theory of insur-
ance liability depending on when insurance is obtained. Since
large asbestos products manufacturers and insurers are generally
equal in bargaining power, there is no reason for the courts to
continue vacillating between exposure and manifestation using
the inherent ambiguity in the contract language to decide in
favor of the insured. The Eagle-Picher decision favoring the
manifestation theory of insurance coverage has added to the
confusion and raised additional problems.
Some implications of the Eagle-Picher decision are trouble-
some. The court held the insurer liable for the period of time
when workers were exposed even though Eagle-Picher had not
and insurance coverage matters, including the evaluation, analysis and deter-
mination of insurance coverage issues.
Brief of Defendants-Appellants Philip Alan Froude, Excess Insurance Company and
Turegum Insurance Company, Ltd. at 22-23, Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982) (citations to trial record omitted) [hereinafter cited as
Brief of Defendants-Appellants].
60. "This doctrine has absolutely no place in negotiated contracts in commercial
lines, where both the buyer and the seller, being large corporations, are represented by
sophisticated agents and attorneys and where the policy provisions, in many instances,
are in fact negotiated line by line, clause by clause." Ward, Coverage for Exposure:
Destructive Judicial Legislation, 24 FOR THE DEFENSE, No. 3 at 12 (1982).
61. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 15, 23.
62. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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then obtained products liability insurance.6" The court's ration-
ale in part was that the corporation's reasonable contractual
expectations were met by invoking the manifestation theory. 4
However, to extrapolate retroactive insurance coverage for the
years Eagle-Picher was uninsured collides with the public policy
of encouraging manufacturers of dangerous products not only to
research products carefully but also to be adequately insured or
self-insured so that victims of unsafe products will be compen-
sated for any loss.
The hazards of asbestos dust have been known since the
beginning of this century and were widely acknowledged in the
United States by the mid-1930's.es Documents illustrate that the
63. Manufacturers may be uninsured for a significant portion of the "exposure
period" for several reasons: no products liability insurance was purchased for business
reasons; no policies can be located because of record destruction programs; no coverage is
available because of corporate acquisitions and mergers. Mansfield, supra note 26, at
877. The court in Eagle-Picher specifically states that Eagle-Picher Industries was unin-
sured prior to 1968. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 23. However, a review of the Brief of
Defendants-Appellants supra note 60, at 22-23 reveals that Eagle-Picher had a piece-
meal program of self-insurance.
64. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 23. Similarly, the Keene court held that the manufac-
turer was not liable during the period it was uninsured, finding each insurance policy
triggered was liable in full because of Keene's reasonable expectations in purchasing the
policy. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1047-49. See also Comment, Insurer Liability in the Asbestos
Disease Context-Application of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 27 S.D.L. REv.
239 (1982)(approving of this doctrine as a common basis for decision in the asbestos
insurance cases). But see Note, Insurance Law and Asbestosis- When Is Coverage of a
Progressive Disease Triggered?, 58 WASH. L. Riy. 63 (1982)(disagreeing with Keene's
reliance on the reasonable expectations doctrine because it adds a potential source of
conflict and the decision is supportable by medical testimony alone).
65. In 1902 asbestos was included by the Inspector of Factories in England in the
list of dusts known to be dangerous to man. In 1918 a vice-president of the Prudential
Life Insurance Company called attention to the probable harmfulness of asbestos dust
and intimated his company would not issue life insurance policies on asbestos workers.
Mehaffy, Asbestos-Related Lung Disease, 16 FORuM 341, 343 (1980). Medical reports
began in 1906 when Dr. Montagu-Murray reported the first asbestos-related death. Med-
ical reports continued but the report of W.E. Cooke in 1924 (Cooke, Fibrosis of the
Lungs Due to the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust, Barr. MaD. J. II 147 (1924)) has been
termed a turning point. Mansfield, supra note 26, at 864.
66. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) for
a history of medical and industrial discovery of dangers of asbestos. The first modern
medical study made of the effects of prolonged exposure to asbestos was the Mer-
iweather-Price Study completed in England in the early 1930's. This report documented
medical evidence that contact with asbestos was associated with pulmonary disease. It
was widely reported among medical researchers and within the asbestos manufacturing
industry. See generally Vagley and Blanton, Aggregation of Claims: Liability for Cer-
tain Illnesses With Long Latency Periods before Manifestation, 16 FORUM 636, 637
(1981).
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asbestos industry had early knowledge of these health hazards. 7
Asbestosis has even been recognized in some states as a compen-
sable disease since then. 8 A landmark case that opened the
floodgates of litigation against manufacturers, Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,s9 established that manufac-
turers must have known of the dangers of their products and
thus were guilty of a failure to warn.70 A manufacturer is held to
possess the skill of an expert in its field for those dangers of
which it has knowledge.71 Yet the First Circuit rewards Eagle-
Picher for its failure to insure or set up an adequate self-insur-
ance fund.72 The main goal of the courts in the underlying prod-
ucts liability tort lawsuits is to compensate the injured victim.
However, an important subsidiary goal of the courts in the
insurance coverage lawsuits should be to encourage manufactur-
67. Mansfield, supra note 26 at 866, 870. Codefendants may benefit in the long run
from Manville's Chapter 11 declaration. Now, three out of four cases are being won by
defendants; prior to Manville's Chapter 11 declaration, defendants won only a third of
the suits. This may result from the greater difficulty of proving that the remaining asbes-
tos manufacturers had actual knowledge of the harmful effects of asbestos now that
Manville is no longer a defendant. Manville allegedly knew asbestos was dangerous as
early as the 1930's and tried to suppress the information. Correspondence from Manville
to other companies discusses the danger, and the letters were introduced into evidence in
several cases. Because Manville is no longer a defendant, it is more difficult to introduce
these letters as evidence. Joseph, After a Lull, Asbestos Suits Being Revived, Wall St. J.
Feb. 9, 1983, at 29, col. 3.
68. Mansfield, supra note 26.
69. 493 F.2d 1076 (1973).
70. Manufacturers have argued that they did not know of hazards of asbestos
because medical studies in the 1930's were conducted in mining, milling or carding oper-
ations and textile plants. No studies were made of shipyard workers, insulation workers
or bystanders. Also in 1946, the Fleisher-Drinker Report, a health survey of shipyard
workers, may have misled the industry by declaring the occupation of covering pipe of
naval vessels with asbestos to be relatively safe. However, plaintiffs argue that medical
articles should have alerted the manufacturer to the possible danger of exposure to even
small amounts of asbestos, and thus they should have provided warnings or conducted
further investigation. Mehaffy, supra note 9, at 343-46.
Regarding whether the decision in Borel can be used to collaterally estop manufac-
turers from presenting evidence concerning their knowledge of asbestos hazards, see
Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982) (courts cannot read
Borel to stand for the proposition that, as matters of fact, asbestos products are unrea-
sonably dangerous or that asbestos as a generic element is in all products a competent
producing cause of cancer); see also Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir.
1982) (Borel cannot serve as precedential authority for the proposition that all asbestos
products are unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law).
71. Karjala v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975).
72. Self-insurance is considered to be any plan of risk retention in which a program
or procedure has been established to meet the adverse results of a financial loss. R. Kzx-
TON, Basic Text on Insurance Law § 1.2(b)(6) (1971).
Manifestation Theory
ers to be responsible by spreading the costs through the
purchase of insurance.
Besides failing to provide incentives for manufacturers to
insure, the court advocates a theory that is least advantageous to
other manufacturers. Although the manifestation theory allows
some benefit for those uninsured in previous years, in the long
run it loses its effect. A principal reason courts have turned
away from the manifestation theory is because of the difficulty
in obtaining insurance in recent years. Since the mid-1970's,
many insurers have refused to offer any further coverage or only
offered coverage subject to restrictions such as large deduct-
ibles.78 Thus, the exposure or triple trigger theories work best to
spread the loss over the years to include insurers on the risk in
the 40's, 50's, and 60's. For the companies that were conscien-
tious enough to obtain insurance at an early date, the manifesta-
tion theory is unfair because it places the burden on the most
recent insurers. With the large deductibles recently imposed by
insurance companies, the manufacturers will be shouldering an
increased burden under the manifestation theory.
Finally, a different theory of insurance coverage in different
circuit courts encourages the parties to file suit in the circuit
that will be most advantageous to them. 4 The manifestation
theory is considered most favorable to insurers because insur-
ance companies providing coverage over the exposure years will
not be held responsible. The triple trigger theory of Keene is
generally most favorable to policy holders.7' Therefore the insur-
ers would select the First Circuit, while policy holders would
choose the D.C. Circuit.
A sounder theory is suggested by Judge Wald in her concur-
ring opinion in Keene. s Wald agrees with the injurious process
approach of the majority-that all insurers covering a manufac-
turer from the time of the first exposure, during exposure in res-
idence and including the manifestation period should be liable.7
However, Wald disagrees with the court's decision to cover the
manufacturer for the years it consciously chose not to insure. s
73. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1215, 1216 n.6; Keene, 667 F.2d at 1045.
74. Tarnoff, Manifestation Ruling Clouds Asbestos Coverage Litigation, Bus. Ins.,
July 12, 1982 at 47.
75. Id.
76. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1058.
77. Id. at 1047.
78. "I just do not understand why an asbestos manufacturer, which has consciously
19831
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Essentially, Wald advocates pro rata apportionment of financial
responsibility with the manufacturer treated as a self-insurer for
the years it failed to take out insurance.7 9 The manufacturer
could still target one company to defend the suit, and if judg-
ment is awarded for the victim, the targeted insurance company
would pay the victim to the extent of the coverage and then seek
contribution from other on-line insurers.80 The self-insured
manufacturer would be included as one of the contributors.8"
This solution has the advantage of comporting with the
medical evidence by viewing the disease as an injurious process.
It would spread the loss over as many insurers and years as pos-
sible yet be consistent so that each court would not decide on a
different theory in order to maximize coverage using the contra
proferentem rationale. By requiring asbestos manufacturers that
were uninsured for certain years to pay their pro rata share, the
courts encourage the purchase of products liability insurance for
dangerous products. Adoption of this theory by the courts would
discourage forum shopping and speed resolution of asbestos-
related disease litigation.
The precedent set by Eagle-Picher is not workable in other
cases. The suggestion by Judge Wald is the best theory yet to
emerge. Under her analysis, all insurers during exposure, expo-
sure in residence, and manifestation are liable; and manufactur-
ers are responsible for the periods of time they are uninsured.
Unless or until a legislative solution is reached,82 an adoption of
this approach by the courts would facilitate litigation in this
burdened area of the law.
Pamela J. Layton
decided not to insure itself during particular years of the exposure-manifestation period,
should have a reasonable expectation that it would be exempt from any liability for inju-
ries that were occurring during the uninsured period." Id. at 1058.
79. The majority in Keene found Judge Wald's alternative appealing but it contra-
dicted their primary rationale that each policy provides Keene with the right to be free
of liability for asbestos-related disease unless such a disease was known or knowable by
Keene at the time it purchased an insurance policy. Id. at 1048. Judge Wald argues that
this initial premise is not to be found in the terms of the policies or in canons of inter-
preting insurance policies and that she must seek her own first premises in notions of
fairness rather than principles of logic. Id. at 1058.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See discussion supra note 7.
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